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SPITE FENCE: A NEWLY
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to which a landowner may vent his anger upon his neigha fence between their respective properties raises questions
injured landowner's cause of action if any, and how his
be ascertained if he does have a cause of action.

A recent Wyoming case,' held for the first time that a spite structure
serving no useful purpose constituted a private nuisance when it injures
the owner or occupant of the adjoining premises. The defendant, as a
result of an altercation arising out of a quiet title suit decided two years
earlier, 2 erected a fence six and one-half feet high which came to within
five and one-half inches of the eaves of the plaintiff's house, which shut
out the plaintiff's light, air, and view and which was but thirteen inches
from the side of the plaintiff's house. The fence was painted with
creosote, the defendant painting the side exposed toward his residence
with white paint while omitting to frther paint the side of his neighbor.
The plaintiff alleged that the fence was erected maliciously as a spite fence,
was maintained as such and that his health had been damaged as a result
of exposure to creosote fumes from which he had contracted dermatitis.
The defendant argued that the fence was on his property, denied that it
was a nuisance or that it was erected maliciously, but even if it were, that
the court could not inquire into the motive he had in building it. However, the court held, that the fence was erected malevolently, constituted a
nuisance, and should be abated to the extent that the height of the fence
should be reduced to a height not exceeding the plaintiff's lower window
sills, and that the plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages.
The element of malice involved in actions causing damages to others
has been, in the most part, developed in the past century. 3 The common
law rule is generally held to be that motive in doing an act that is not
unlawful per se is immaterial 4 . and does not constitute an element of a
civil wrong.5 There is substantial authority to the effect that such is not
the true common law rule.6 Be that as it may, the Wyoming Supreme Court
has, in the past, considered such to be the rule, as evidenced by the statement made by Chief Justice Potter in the case of Anthony Wilkinson Live
Stock Co. v. Mcllquam, 7 that in determining whether the use of one's
property is or is not a nuisance, the motive of the party has no connection
with injury or bearing upon the result. The common law is still followed
I.
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Erickson et ux. v. Hudson et ux., 70 Wyo. 317, 249 P.2d 523 (1952).
Hudson et ux. v. Erickson et ux., 67 Wyo. 167 216 P.2d 379 (1950).
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See note 1, supra.
Stevenson v. Newnham, 138 Eng. Reprints 1208 (1853), p. 1211.
Allen v. Flood, App. Cas. (1898), p. 1.
Walton: Motive as an Element in Torts in the Common and in the Civil Law,
22 Harv. L. Rev. 501 (1909); 22 Law Quarterly Review 118 (1906); Mogul
Steamship Co. v. McCregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q. B. D. (1889), p. 598; Quinn v.
Leathern, App. Cas. (1901),
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p. 495.

Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co. v. McIlquam, 14 Wyo. 209, 83 Pac. 364, 3 L.R.A.,
NS, 733 (1905).
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to a great extent today8 and the injured neighbor is denied relief in the
courts. But there is a growing group of jurisdictions that hold contra to the
common law rule9 and among whose ranks Wyoming has placed itself by
its decision in the instant case. The reason tendered to support the rule
of this latter group is that the right to use one's own property for the sole
purpose of maliciously injuring another without serving any useful purpose
is not one of the immediate and indestructible rights of ownership. 1°
Special note should be given to the qualification that no useful purpose be
subserved by the use, for courts will deny an injunction if they believe some
benefit is derived to the defendant. 1
Some of the jurisdictions whose supreme courts have felt that they
were bound to follow the older rule have resorted to legislative relief, by
the creation of a statutory cause of action for the plaintiff.' 2 Such statutes
have been held constitutional in the face of claims that they constitute a
taking of property without due process of law, by the reasoning that though
the right to erect a spite fence is a legal right it is not one of the immediate
rights of property and for the further reason that such a right is so inconsequential that a state may validly deprive a property owner of it under its
police power without the necessity of making compensation.13 Municipal
ordinances designed to prevent spite fences have also been held constitutionally valid when such a right to control is granted to the city from the
4
state in its municipal charter.'
In those jurisdictions which have adopted the rule that a spite fence
,s an actionable wrong, the courts have been confronted with the problem
of the selection of a suitable evidentiary test of the presence of malice on
8.
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Russell v. State, 32 Ind. 243, 69 N.E. 482 (1904); Truplett v. Jackson, 5 Kan. App.
777, 48 Pac. 931 (1897) ; Saddler v. Alexander, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1835, 56 S.W. 518 (1900) ;
Lord v. Langdon, 91 Me. 221, 39 A. 552 (1898); Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368,
19 N.E. 390 (1889) ; Bordeaux v. Greene, 22 Mont. 255, 56 Pac. 218 (1899) ; Mahan v.
Brown, 13 Wend. (N.Y.) 261 (1885); Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 142 N.E. 765
(1896); Maioriello v. Arlotta, 364 Pa. 557, 73 A.2d 374 (1950); Karasek v. Peier,
22 Wash. 419, 61 Pac. 33 (1900); Koblegard v. Hale, 60 W.Va. 37, 53 S.E. 793 (1906);
Metzger v. Hochreim, 107 Wisc. 267, 83 N.W. 308 (1900).
Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912); De Mers v. Groupner, 186
Ark. 214, 53 S.W.2d 8 (1932); Hornsby v. Smith, 191 Go. 491, 13 S.E.2d 20 (1941) ;
Parker v. Harvey, La. App., 164 So. 507 (1935); Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37
N.W. 838 (1888) ; Stroup v. Rauschcelbach, 217 Mo. App. 236, 261 S.W. 346 (1924) ;
Bush v. Mockett, 95 Neb. 553, 145 N.W. 1001 (1914); Horan v. Byrnes, 72 N.H. 93,
54 A. 94 (1903); Barger v. Barringer, 151 N.C. 433, 66 S.E. 439 (1909); Hibbard v.
Halliday, 58 Okla. 244, 158 p. 1158 (1916); Musumeci v. Leonardo, R.I., 75 A.2d
175 (1950); Racich v. Mastrovich, 65 S.D. 321, 273 N.W. 660 (1937); McCorkle v.
Driskell, Tenn., 60 S.W. 172 (1900).
Bush v. Mockett, note 9, supra.
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Conn. Gen. Stat. c. 413, sec. 8311; Rev.-Stat. Me. 1949, c. 128, sec. 6; Gen. L. of
Mass. 1932, c. 49, sec. 21; Rev. Stat. N.H. 1942, c. 269, sec. 32; Vt. Stat. Rev. 1947,
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the part of the defendant. A general guide was set out, and has been
followed in subsequent cases, in the case of Gallagher v. Dodge,'5 that a
structure is erected for spite when from its character, or location, or use,
it would strike the ordinary beholder as manifestly erected with a leading
purpose to annoy the adjoining owner or occupant in his use of his premises.
This rule has subsequently been held not to mean that it should be relied
upon to the exclusion of all other evidence which is legitimate to cast light
upon the issue.16 Such evidence must be clear -and convincing.17 One
may also prove the intent to injure by proof of any depreciation in value
of the plaintiff's land.', The evidentiary hurdle of a suitable standard
by which to judge whether a particular annoyance constitutes a nuisance
was summarily dealt with by the Wyoming court when it expressly adopted
the rule propounded in American Jurisprudence.' 9 The criterion for
determining whether a particular annoyance or inconvenience is sufficient
to constitute a nuisance is its effect upon an ordinarily reasonable man, that is, a normal person of ordinary habits and sensibilities, - and not its
effect upon supersensitive persons, those of too fastidious tastes, those
in ill health, afflicted with disease or abnormal physical conditions, or, on
the other hand, those who are hardened or imune to annoyances or disturbances of the kind in question.
The question of the proper damages to be awarded presents a more
difficult problem. In the instant case the court held, that if the order
of the court cutting down the fence is correct, plaintiff would be entitled
to at least nominal damages because of the discomforts that plaintiffs
might have suffered by reason of the obstruction of the light caused by
the height of the fence. But the damage for such discomfort would be hard
to estimate. The court has a number of times held that ordinarily a case
will not be reversed because plaintiffs would be entitled to nominal damages
only. Thus, indicating that more substantial damages would be allowed
if sufficiently proven, particularly if they consist of anything in the nature
of impairment of health. Should the fence be a continuing nuisance, a
plaintiff should be entitled to a sum that would reasonably compensate
him for the diminution in value of his premises as well as constitute a
reasonable recovery for the annoyance and vexation caused by its presence.2 0
It has been held that a plaintiff will not be entitled to recover punitive
damages nor damages for injury to feeling or embarassment, 21 which must
necessarily accompany such contests between neighbors.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the proper choice was made by the
court in recognizing the existence of such a cause of action. In recognizing
15.

Gallagher v. Dodge, 48 Conn. 387 (1880).
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Karasek v. Peier, note 8, supra.
Hornsby v. Smith, note 9, supra.
See note 14, supra.
39 Am. Jur., par. 31, p. 311.
Humphrey v. Mausbach, 251 Ky. 66, 64 S.W.2d 454 (1933).
See note 9, supra.

NOTES
the wrong that would have gone unremedied had the common law been
followed, the court heeded the dictates of common sense as well as basic
morality. In the language of the court, a rule of law carried to its extreme
conclusion is often extreme injustice.
RICHARD L. LEEDY
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Priorities as between classes of stock are creatures of contract.' If one
class of stock has a priority to dividends over another class of stock, it is
commonly referred to as "preferred stock". Preferred stock can, by express
provision, be given a priority as to return of the capital investment on
dissolution. It quite often is also preferred on dissolution to an amount
equal to the unpaid and accrued dividends. The articles of incorporation
may state or deny many other priorities or rights to preferred stock.
In the absence of an express provision in the articles of incorporation,
creating a priority or right for preferred stock on dissolution, several problems can arise. It has been generally accepted that if on dissolution
capital remains to be distributed, the so-called "equality rule" is applied
in the absence of an express provision for capital distribution on dissolution. 2 Under the "equality rule" all classes of stock share in the distribution in proportion to their investment. However, if on dissolution, after
payment of the corporate debts, and after return of the capital investment
to all classes of stock, assets remain to be distributed, the question arises
as to the respective rights of each class of stock to such surplus in the
absence of an express provision covering surplus distribution on dissolution.
Four variations of this problem can arise:
FACT SITUATION NUMBER 1:
a) Preferred has a prority as to dividends, but none accrued or unpaid.
b) Preferred has a liquidation preference as to capital, but there is no
provision for the distribution of surplus on dissolution.
c) Assets to be distributed on dissolution, after payment of debts, are
greater than capital, therefore surplus remains to be distributed as well
as capital.
1.

2.

Hamlin v. Toledo, St. L. & K.C. R. Co., 78 Fed. 664, 36 L.R.A. 826 (6th Cir. 1897);'
Lloyd v Pennsylvania Electric Vehicle Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 263, 72 At. 16, 21 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 228, 138 Am. St. Rep. 557, 20 Ann Cas. 119 (1909); Williams v. Renshaw,
220 App. Div. 39, 220 N.Y.S. 532 (1927); Drewry, Hughes Co. v. Throckmorton,
120 Va. 859, 92 S.E. 818 (1917). See also I COOK ON CORPORATIONS sec. 269
7th ed. 1913); 11 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS sec. 5295 (per.
ed. 1932); and 1 MACHEM sec. 525 (1st ed. 1908).
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Galveston City R. Co., 107 Fed. 311 (5th Cir. 1901); Teller
v. Wilcoxen, 1 10 Iowa 565, 81 N.W. 772 (1900); Coltrane v. Baltimore, etc. Assoc.,
110 Fed. 281 (1901); People v. New York, etc., Co., 50 N.Y. Misc. Rep. 23 (1906).
See also 5 THOMPSON ON CORPORATIONS sec. 6590 (2d ed. 1910); 1 COOK ON
CORPORATIONS sec. 278 (7th ed. 1913); 1 MACHEN, MODERN LAW OF
CORPORATIONS sec. 564 (1st ed. 1908).

